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THE UBIT: LEVELING AN UNEVEN PLAYING
FIELD OR TILTING A LEVEL ONE?
Michael S. Knoll*
INTRODUCTION
If you take a walk along the Upper West Side of Manhattan, you will see
numerous restaurants, especially on the avenues. There is, however, a
stretch of the west side of Broadway, between 60th and 65th Streets, where
there are no restaurants open to the public. Occupying that land are two
prominent New York institutions: the Lincoln Center for the Performing
Arts and Fordham Law School. The difficult time that pedestrians walking
past Lincoln Center and Fordham have finding a bagel or a latte will change
when the remodeled Lincoln Center opens in 2010. The current renovation
plans call for tearing down the wall that separates Lincoln Center from the
pedestrian traffic along Broadway and opening the plaza, famous for its
fountain, to the street. Like much contemporary urban architecture, the
buildings at Lincoln Center seek to integrate that institution into its
neighborhood by removing barriers that keep out pedestrians. Lincoln
Center will also reach out to its neighbors by hosting several restaurants
open to the public. The managers of Lincoln Center hope that those
restaurants will attract not only individuals attending events at the center,
but also passersby and neighborhood residents. By operating restaurants
open to the general public, Lincoln Center will find itself in direct
competition with numerous private restaurants in the area.1 However,
unlike almost all of the establishments with which it will compete, the
Lincoln Center restaurants will be owned and operated by a nonprofit
organization. As a nonprofit under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, Lincoln Center is exempt from federal tax on its income from
activities that are related to its exempt function. Almost all competing
establishments—whether owned by individuals directly, through passthrough entities, or through corporations—are not tax exempt. That
* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor of
Real Estate, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. I have benefited from
presentations made at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the University of
Toronto’s Tax Law and Policy Workshop, and the Fordham University School of Law and
Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts Symposium Nonprofit Law, Economic Challenges,
and the Future of Charities. I thank Alvin Dong for his assistance with the research.
1. Currently, the eating establishments within Lincoln Center cannot be seen from the
street and are mostly inside of venues that require tickets for entry. They also compete with
private restaurants, but not as directly as will the new restaurants.
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situation raises two policy questions: Will the Lincoln Center restaurants
have a tax-induced advantage over other restaurants in competing for
diners? And if so, would a tax on the unrelated business income of
nonprofits, if it applied to the Lincoln Center restaurants, undo that
advantage?
Although the Lincoln Center renovation raises the two questions posed
above, they are not unique to it. For-profit businesses frequently find
themselves in direct competition with nonprofits. Universities, religious
institutions, museums, and other nonprofit organizations frequently operate
restaurants. They also operate bookstores, gift shops, coffee shops, hotels,
gyms, and other facilities that are open to the public. These facilities,
which compete directly with for-profit facilities, often fall within the
nonprofit’s tax exemption.
In some instances, the competition from nonprofits might appear to be an
insignificant threat to private enterprise. Think, for example, of one Girl
Scout selling cookies. In aggregate, however, the Girl Scouts sell many
cookies, some portion of which reduces the sales of for-profit bakeries. In
other cases, the competition might seem small from a national perspective,
but still constitutes a serious threat to a small group of local competitors. In
some instances, nonprofits have started ventures that were narrowly focused
on taking customers away from competing for-profit businesses. For
example, in Chicago in the 1990s, several major museums, including the
Art Institute, Shedd Aquarium, and the Field Museum, began holding
afternoon cocktail parties where they produced revenue through admissions
fees and drink sales. These events, which were in direct competition with
more traditional watering holes, were specifically aimed at shifting
customers from bars and restaurants to the museums.2
In still other fields, for-profit and nonprofit businesses regularly compete
head-to-head. For example, there are both nonprofit and for-profit day care
facilities, nursing homes, hospitals, and schools. In all of these fields, forprofit businesses and nonprofits exist side by side. They regularly compete
against one another for customers, and, in many markets, both nonprofits
and for-profit businesses hold substantial market shares.
Although the commercial activities of nonprofits are most visible when
nonprofits sell directly to consumers, nonprofits also compete with forprofit entities in the business-to-business sector of the economy. For
example, in Nashville, Tennessee, Baptist Hospital, the region’s largest
nonprofit hospital, built a $15 million, eighteen-acre office and training
facility that it rents to the Tennessee Titans professional football team.3

2. Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler, Commerce and the Muse: Are Art Museums
Becoming Commercial?, in To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial Transformation of
the Nonprofit Sector 233, 233–48 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
3. Id. at 288. This source was published before the completion of the hospital facility
and refers to the Houston Oilers, now the Tennessee Titans.

2007]

THE UBIT

859

Many nonprofits have embraced the opportunity to compete head-to-head
with for-profit enterprises by venturing outside of their traditional range of
activities. One nonprofit that was an early and enthusiastic entrant into
commercial businesses is the Young Women’s Christian Association
(YWCA). Starting in the late 1980s, the YWCA began buying and building
businesses. Over a fifteen-year period, the YWCA developed a computer
software company, purchased a plastics company, started a clothing design
line, opened a charter school, operated a ceiling tile business, and invested
in real estate in partnership with other investors. These endeavors,
however, were largely unsuccessful, and the YWCA has since shuttered or
sold almost all of those businesses.4
In spite of nonprofits’ mixed track record in commercial endeavors, the
trend toward greater competition between nonprofits and for-profit firms
shows little sign of slowing. Some sophisticated parties are betting that the
trend will continue. For example, Yale’s School of Management has
established a program to help charities develop business plans for entry into
commercial markets.5
The commercial activities of nonprofits have not gone unnoticed by their
for-profit competitors. For-profit firms have been critical of nonprofits
venturing into commercial activities. Of course, most business owners
would like to have fewer competitors. However, the complaint that forprofit firms have voiced about nonprofits has not been regarding
competition generally. Instead, their complaint is narrower and more
focused. For-profit firms, and their supporters, argue that nonprofits enjoy
a tax-induced competitive advantage by virtue of their exemption from the
federal income tax.
Nonprofits are taxed differently than are for-profit businesses. For-profit
businesses and their owners are subject to tax on the income generated from
operations,6 even if the income is reinvested in the business. In contrast,
nonprofits are generally exempt from tax.7 That exemption from tax is
widely perceived as providing nonprofits with an unfair competitive
advantage over competing for-profit businesses. Congress agreed and in
1954 enacted the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT),8 which taxes
nonprofits on their income from commercial activities that are unrelated to

4. Bruce Murphy, Missions Collide When Non-profits Try Business, Milwaukee J.
Sentinel, May 31, 2004, at 1A. Some of these ventures were for-profit while others were
not.
5. Press Release, Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Yale School of Management Receives Twin
Grants Totaling $4.5 Million from the Goldman Sachs Foundation and the Pew Charitable
Trusts to Foster Business Growth Among Nonprofit Organizations; Partnership Creates
First-of-Its-Kind Business Plan Competition (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://mba.yale.edu/news_events/CMS/Articles/203.shtml. Universities are frequently in
competition with for-profit entities in providing postgraduate training programs.
6. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (2000).
7. See id. § 501(c)(3).
8. The statute was drafted on August 16, 1954.
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their exempt function.9 The UBIT is seen as leveling the playing field
between for-profit firms and nonprofit firms when the latter enter into
commercial activities in competition with for-profit firms.10
The purpose of this essay is to reexamine the level playing field
argument for the UBIT. Specifically, the essay addresses the question of
whether and under what circumstances the tax exemption granted to
nonprofits gives them an advantage in competition with for-profit firms.
The essay attempts to determine whether the UBIT is an appropriate
response to whatever advantage might exist. In addition, if the UBIT does
not level the playing field, the essay examines how the commercial
activities of nonprofits should be taxed to ensure that taxes do not provide
any competitors with an advantage or disadvantage.11
I. THE HISTORY SURROUNDING ENACTMENT OF THE UBIT
From the very beginning of the U.S. federal income tax, the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code)12 has recognized the unique role played by
private, nonprofit charities by exempting such organizations from tax.13
That exemption, which now appears in § 501(c)(3), excludes from federal
income taxation corporations “organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes or to foster amateur sports or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals.”14
In order for a § 501(c)(3) organization to maintain its exemption from
federal income taxation, it must meet two requirements. First, “no part of
the net earnings” of the organization can inure “to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.”15 That requirement, which has been termed the
“nondistribution constraint” by Henry Hansmann, prevents charitable
organizations from issuing equity or from paying out their profits through

9. See I.R.C. § 511 (2000).
10. The unrelated business income tax (UBIT) is sometimes also justified as protecting
tax collections against erosion.
11. This essay, which is part of a broader project on the relationship between taxes and
competitiveness, is an outgrowth of Michael S. Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness (Univ. of
Pa. Law Sch., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 06-28, 2006).
12. Throughout this essay, all section references, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and codified in title 26 of the U.S. Code.
13. Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299 (1976) (tracing taxable exemption back to
the Revenue Act of 1894, the corporation income tax of 1909, and the Revenue Act of
1913).
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
15. Id.
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incentive-based pay.16 Second, the organization must refrain from
engaging in prohibited lobbying and political activities.17
Prior to the enactment of the UBIT in 1954, charitable organizations
were completely exempt from tax. That exemption included income from
both related and unrelated businesses. Because a charity’s business income
was not subject to tax, the only potentially harmful tax consequence to a
charity from operating a business was loss of its exempt status. Although
the courts were reluctant to impose such a draconian penalty, the
government repeatedly challenged charities’ exempt status on the basis of
their commercial activities.
Thus, in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, the taxing authority sought to tax a
religious order on the income it received from investments and commercial
activities.18 The order derived about three percent of its income from the
sale of wine, chocolate, and other items for use in its churches and schools,
with the rest of its income coming from passive investments.19 The
government argued that the order, because it engaged in the sales, was
operated for business purposes, and thus was not entitled to the
exemption.20 In the courts, the tax collector went 0 for 3, losing in the trial
court, the appellate court, and the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
held that the sales did not constitute a trade.21 The Court also held that the
order could not be taxed on its income from commercial and investment
activities because all of the income from the challenged sales went to
support the organization’s exempt activities.22 Trinidad has come to stand
for the proposition that it is the destination, not the source, of the income
that determines whether a corporation is organized for charitable purposes.
That principle is called the destination principle, and courts have used it for
more than eighty years to define the scope of the charitable exemption.
Although the commercial activities of the religious order in Trinidad
were small by almost any measure and closely related to the order’s exempt
function, following Trinidad, some charities began to operate purely
commercial activities. One such entity was Roche’s Beach, Inc. Roche’s
Beach rented bathhouses and umbrellas and sold refreshments to bathers. It
turned over its profits to a tax-exempt charitable foundation for the relief of
poor women and children. Citing the destination principle in Trinidad, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Roche’s Beach was
exempt from the federal income tax.23
16. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838
(1980). Henry Hansmann has cataloged the consequences of nonprofits enjoying a taxinduced advantage in competitiveness over for-profit businesses, interference with
diversification, and encouragement of managerial inefficiency.
17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
18. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 579 (1924).
19. Id. at 580 n.1.
20. Id. at 580–81.
21. Id. at 582.
22. Id. at 581.
23. Roche’s Beach, Inc. v. Comm’r, 96 F.2d 776, 778–79 (2d Cir. 1938).
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Roche’s Beach opened the door for charitable organizations looking to
operate for-profit commercial businesses, and many charities followed the
path laid out by the federal courts in Trinidad and Roche’s Beach. Charities
would organize feeder corporations, separately incorporated entities that
owned and operated commercial businesses.24 These feeder corporations
would not directly advance the charity’s exempt purpose. Instead, they
would be operated in a businesslike manner with the goal of earning a
profit. However, unlike traditional, for-profit corporations, these feeder
corporations would funnel their profits, if any, to their charitable parents for
the benefit of the exempt charitable organizations. Except for transferring
their profits to their charitable parents, such feeder corporations were
otherwise indistinguishable from their traditional for-profit competitors.
By far, the most famous feeder corporation was the spaghetti and
macaroni manufacturer, the C.F. Mueller Co. In the 1940s, alumni from
New York University (NYU) School of Law purchased Mueller, at that
time the country’s largest producer of macaroni, for the benefit of the
university’s law school. The group organized a Delaware corporation for
the charitable purpose of operating Mueller’s business and distributing the
profits thereby earned to the school. The corporation borrowed roughly $3
million—the full purchase price—and used the proceeds to buy all of the
outstanding stock of Mueller, which it then merged into itself. In effect,
NYU acquired Mueller by assuming $3 million in debt. The feeder
corporation operated Mueller’s business profitably, distributing all profits to
NYU for the benefit of its law school. Neither the feeder corporation nor
NYU paid any federal income taxes on Mueller’s profits.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenged the transaction and
sought to tax the feeder corporation on its profits. The commissioner was
successful in the Tax Court,25 but he was shot down by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which saw no difference except for size
between Roche’s Beach and Mueller.26
Although larger than the amounts at issue in Trinidad and Roche, the
amount of money involved in Mueller was still not very large. Of course,
Mueller was not the only feeder corporation owned and operated by a
charity. In fact, Mueller was not the only business owned and operated by
NYU. At the time, NYU also owned American Limoges China, Ramsey
Corporation (which manufactured pistons), and Howes Leather Company.
The last, Howes, was valued at $35 million—more than ten times as much
as the value NYU placed on Mueller.
Moreover, NYU was not the only university to own and operate
commercial businesses. In December 1948, The New York Times published
what it called a nationwide study that described how educational
institutions were “investing their endowment funds in real estate, large24. Id.
25. See generally C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 922 (1950).
26. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm’r, 190 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’g 14 T.C. 922.
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scale commercial ventures and other various businesses.”27 Among the
varied businesses that The New York Times listed as owned and operated by
educational institutions were (in addition to the NYU businesses) the
following: a street car company, an airport, a cattle ranch, a walnut grove,
and filling stations.28 Furthermore, according to the New York Times
report, universities and colleges were also major investors in commercial
real estate. Among the high profile real estate holdings of educational
institutions at the time were Union College’s ownership of the real estate of
Allied Stores and Abraham & Straus, Columbia University’s ownership of
Rockefeller Center, and Cooper Union’s ownership of the land on which
sits the Chrysler Building.29
The entry of tax-exempt educational institutions into commercial
businesses and real estate in competition with private, taxable owners raised
questions of unfair competition. Thus, from the first page of The New York
Times in December 1948:
Concern has been expressed by both the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Internal Revenue Bureau over this turn of events. The
charge of “unfair competition” has been raised in some quarters. Since
the profits of college-owned or college-operated corporations go to the
institution and are used for educational purposes, they are tax-exempt.30

That concern soon took the form of a law. In 1954, Congress enacted the
UBIT.31 The UBIT imposes tax on many otherwise tax-exempt institutions,
including private universities, on the incomes they earn on activities that are
unrelated to their exempt functions.32 The UBIT is generally imposed at
the same tax rates that apply to corporations.33
The rationale for the UBIT was and is that without such a provision
charities would enjoy an unfair tax-derived competitive advantage over
their taxable competitors.34 The UBIT offsets that advantage by subjecting

27. Benjamin Fine, University Dollars Yielding Tax-Free Business Profits, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1948, at A1.
28. Id.
29. Id. Educational institutions that owned commercial real estate generally leased the
land to long-term tenants. In many cases, the tenant was also the party that had sold the land
to the school. Such a transaction is called a sale-leaseback because the seller leases the
property back from the buyer.
30. Id.
31. Imposition of Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Charitable, etc., Organizations,
ch. 736, 68A Stat. 169 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 511 (2000)).
32. Id. § 511(a)(2)(B).
33. Id. § 511(a)(1). The corporate income tax schedule is set out in I.R.C. § 11.
34. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. Corp. L. 585, 605–06 (1998); Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced
Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 663, 677–79 (1989); Mark A.
Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 Ohio
St. L.J. 1379, 1442–43 (1991); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated
Business Income Tax, 75 Va. L. Rev. 605, 605–07 (1989). But see Ethan G. Stone, Adhering
to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 54 Emory L.J. 1475, 1484 n.29 (2005) (arguing that the purpose behind the
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otherwise tax-exempt organizations to tax on their income from unrelated
commercial operations. The UBIT, thus, levels what would otherwise be an
unlevel playing field. It works by placing both for-profit and nonprofit
entities on similar tax terms when they engage in commercial activities.
The legislative history of the UBIT contains numerous statements that
the purpose behind the tax is to protect for-profit businesses from unfair
competition from tax-exempt businesses. Most famously, Representative
John Dingell warned his colleagues that unless the UBIT is enacted “the
macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the universities . . . . Eventually
all the noodles produced in this country will be produced by corporations
held or created by universities . . . .”35 Similarly, both the House and
Senate reports accompanying the final bill underscored the problem of
unfair competition:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is
primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of [§ 501(c)(3)]
organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand
operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits
remaining after taxes.36

And to this day, the Treasury Regulations continue to sound the same
theme: “The primary objective of [the UBIT] was to eliminate a source of
unfair competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain
exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the non-exempt business
endeavors with which they compete.”37
II. HOW THE UBIT OPERATES
The UBIT applies to virtually all tax-exempt organizations, including
those exempt under § 501(c)(3). If an exempt organization carries on
unrelated business activities to such an extent that its primary purpose is no
longer the exempt purpose, it will lose its exemption.38 If it carries on the
activities to a lesser extent, those activities will be subject to the UBIT. In
order for an activity of an exempt organization to be subject to the UBIT, it
must meet the following three criteria:

UBIT was not to prevent unfair competition, but to protect and justify (politically) the tax
exemption of charities by discouraging them from engaging in commercial activities).
35. Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, H. of
Reps., 81st Cong. 580 (1950) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Member of the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means).
36. S. Rep. No. 81-2375, at 28 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3081; see
also H.R. Rep. No. 81-2319, at 38 (1950).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (2006).
38. The language of § 501(c)(3) requires that an exempt organization be organized and
operated “exclusively” for exempt purposes. Interpreted literally, § 501(c)(3) would prevent
an exempt organization from engaging in any commercial activity. The courts, however,
have never interpreted the requirement of exclusive operation literally. Instead, in order to
maintain the exemption, the courts require than an entity must be organized and operated
“primarily” for exempt purposes.
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(1) the activity must be a trade or business;
(2) the activity must be regularly carried on; and
(3) the activity must be unrelated to the organization’s exempt
purpose.39

The most frequently litigated of these three criteria is the last one. An
unrelated trade or business is defined in § 513 as any trade or business that
is not substantially related to the exercise or performance by such
organization of its charitable, educational, or other exempt function.
Whether an activity is related to the entity’s exempt purpose is often a
complicated factual determination involving difficult line drawing. The
cases and other authorities are numerous, and often seemingly in conflict.40
Although the line between related and unrelated business activities is
often unclear, the consequences of falling on the wrong side of the line are
clear. The unrelated business income of a tax-exempt organization is
subject to tax, generally at the corporate rate.41 Unrelated business income
is defined as the gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business
less allowable deductions directly connected with carrying on the unrelated
trade or business.42 In other words, the UBIT is imposed on net income,
not gross income, just like the regular federal income tax.43
The logic for the UBIT is also clear. The exemption from tax enjoyed by
charities that own and operate commercial businesses translates into an
advantage in competitiveness over for-profit businesses. Subjecting the
unrelated business income of charities to tax on roughly the same terms as
the income of private competitors eliminates the charity’s tax advantage and
its resulting competitive advantage.44

39. I.R.C. §§ 512(a)(1), 513 (2000).
40. John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 487, 500–07 (2002). For an in-depth survey of the cases interpreting the
phrase “unrelated trade or business,” see Carla Neeley Freitag, Unrelated Business Income
Tax, 874-2d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA), at A-43–A-90 (2001).
41. I.R.C. § 511(a). Corporations are taxed under I.R.C. § 11. Trusts are subject to tax
under I.R.C. § 1(e). See also id. § 511(b).
42. Id. § 512(b). The limitation that deductible expenses be directly related to the
unrelated business is considered to be narrower than the limitations of deductible business
expenses to those that are ordinary and necessary.
43. However, with a tax-exempt entity there is an obvious incentive for the entity to
allocate as much of its expenses from exempt activities to the unrelated business activity as
possible. When so allocated, such expenses reduce tax liability, whereas if they are allocated
to the exempt activity they generate no tax savings. Thus, to limit the expenses that can be
allocated, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) only allows the direct expenses of earning
the unrelated income to be allocated to that income.
44. Section 514, which sweeps the income from debt-financed property into the UBIT, is
discussed Part IV.C.
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III. THE EXEMPTION OF NONPROFITS FROM TAX: DOES IT PROVIDE AN
ADVANTAGE IN COMPETITIVENESS?
The legislative statements accompanying the UBIT suggest two possible
routes by which the charitable tax exemption advantages nonprofits relative
to for-profit firms. First, as described by the 1950 House and Senate
reports, the exemption increases nonprofits’ cash flow relative to that of
competing for-profit firms. If both nonprofit and for-profit firms reinvest
their after-tax profits in commercial businesses, a profitable business owned
by a nonprofit will grow faster than an otherwise identical business owned
by a for-profit firm.45 The problem with that argument is that it contains an
implicit assumption about raising equity capital. While it is true that
nonprofits cannot raise equity, for-profit firms can and often do raise
equity.46 If there are good investment opportunities available, for-profit
firms can finance them by raising additional equity. Thus, the faster growth
through reinvestment argument is without merit.
Second, as implied by Representative Dingell’s famous remark,
nonprofits and for-profit firms compete to acquire businesses and real
estate. There are numerous possible owners of a given business or building,
and the party that values a given asset the most will usually outbid others to
acquire it.47 Value is affected by many factors, but one of the most
important is the cash flow generated by an asset. The more cash an owner
can generate from an asset, the more value it will place on that asset. Thus,
if by virtue of their tax exemption nonprofits can generate more cash flow
than their competitors from the same assets, they will likely value those
assets more highly than their competitors and be able to outbid them to
acquire those assets. That is the usual logic behind the argument that taxes,
and specifically the exemption from taxation, can be the basis for
nonprofits’ advantage in competitiveness. 48
I illustrate that second argument by modeling the competition between
nonprofits and for-profit businesses as an auction for a single asset with two
bidders.49 Denote the nonprofit bidder by N and the for-profit bidder by P.
Assume that the candidate investment will produce $100,000 a year in
perpetuity before tax whether the asset is owned by N or P. In the case of a
passive financial asset such as a stock or bond, that assumption is obvious
and trivial. However, when the asset is an actively managed business, that
assumption is not obvious and, if made, has real content. It implies that the
45. See supra Introduction.
46. Although firms listed on stock exchanges are often reluctant to issue new equity
publicly, they often issue equity in other forms.
47. The New York University alumni group was not the only possible or even feasible
purchaser of Mueller. In addition to the former owners, who had to be induced to sell
through an acceptable offer, there were other potential buyers.
48. See Hansmann, supra note 34, at 610 (arguing that the charitable tax exemption
reduces the cost of capital and thereby provides an advantage for nonprofits relative to forprofit firms).
49. The argument follows that in Knoll, supra note 11.
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two firms are equally efficient managers of the asset. Some readers might
find that assumption dubious. Nonetheless, it plays an important role in the
argument below by isolating the tax consequences of the differential tax
treatment of nonprofits and for-profit businesses.
Next, introduce taxes into the equation. Assume P pays tax at 35% and
N is exempt from tax. Because N is exempt, N will not have to pay any tax
on its income from the candidate investment. N, therefore, will earn
$100,000 a year after taxes.
Now consider P. P has to pay tax on its income from the perpetuity.
Assuming that there is no depreciation allowance, which is the
economically accurate result,50 P will report $100,000 of income each year
from the candidate investment. Taxed at 35%, P will pay $35,000 in tax
each year, leaving P with $65,000 after tax.
The conclusion that N will value the candidate investment more highly
than P is usually thought to follow directly from such a comparison of aftertax cash flows. The argument goes as follows: If N purchases the asset, N
can avoid P’s annual $35,000 tax obligation. N should, therefore, value the
asset more than P because the asset generates an additional $35,000 more in
cash flow in N’s hands than in P’s. Accordingly, N will outbid P to acquire
the asset. That is also the logic behind Representative Dingell’s alarmist
remark about a macaroni monopoly. Although that remark seems naïve,
Representative Dingell was only following the above widely accepted
argument to its logical conclusion. The problem is not with the logic—
although there are solid reasons unrelated to tax for believing that there are
limits on the ability of nonprofits to displace for-profit firms—but with the
premise. That there is no advantage in competitiveness from tax exemption
can be illustrated by continuing with the example.
The information given above is not sufficient to calculate the value N and
P each place on the asset. To convert a stream of cash flows into a present
value requires a discount rate. Typically, the discount rate is a function of
the interest rate at which additional funds can be invested. Assume further
that N and P can both invest excess cash at 10% before tax.51 Moreover,
assume that excess funds are readily invested in assets whose returns are
taxed fully each year at ordinary rates. Such an asset is commonly referred
to as the benchmark asset.52
The information provided above is now sufficient to calculate the value
of the candidate investment to both N and P. Start with N. The cash flow is
untaxed so N will receive $100,000 a year. N can earn 10% on its
investments (ignore risk). The formula for the present value of a (constant)
perpetuity is the quotient of the after-tax cash flow and the after-tax
50. Because the perpetuity does not decline in value as payments are made, but rather
holds its value, no depreciation allowance is necessary.
51. The assumption that all parties earn the same before-tax cash flow on their funds is
common.
52. See Myron S. Scholes et al., Tax and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach 120
(2005).
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discount rate. Because N is tax-exempt, the before- and after-tax cash flows
are $100,000 and the discount rate is 10%. Thus, the present value (PV) of
the asset to N, PV(N), is given by the following equation:53
(1)

PV(N) = $100,000/.1 = $1,000,000

What it means for the present value of the candidate investment, PV(N), to
equal $1 million is that if N had $1 million in cash available to invest, N
could deposit that money in the bank and generate the same cash flow
stream as it gets from owning the candidate investment. Thus, the
maximum amount that N will bid for the candidate investment is $1 million.
Any higher, N is better off with the money in the bank; any lower, N is
better off with the investment.
Now consider P. P earns $65,000 a year after tax. The difference
between $65,000 and $100,000 is the basis for the claim that P is at a
disadvantage relative to N. P earns less from the asset than does N solely
because P is taxed, whereas N is tax exempt. However, P also has a
different discount rate than does N. P can invest excess funds at 10%.
Because P pays tax at a rate of 35%, P earns 6.5% after tax. Thus, in
discounting the after-tax cash flows from the candidate investment, P will
use an after-tax discount rate of 6.5%. Hence, the present value of the asset
to P, PV(P), is given by the following equation:54
(2)

PV(P) = $65,000/.065 = $1,000,000

Thus, the present value of the candidate investment to P, which is also the
maximum amount P will bid for that asset, is $1 million. N and P,
therefore, both value the candidate investment at $1 million. Accordingly,
neither N nor P has a tax-induced competitive advantage over the other in
the competition to acquire the candidate investment. Therefore, in spite of
their different tax treatments, N and P compete on equal terms for the
candidate investment.
Accordingly, if either party is slightly more efficient than the other in
owning or operating the candidate investment, then that party will be able to
outbid the other party. For example, if P can squeeze an additional $10 a
year before tax from the investment (1/100th of 1% of the cash flow), then
P will receive an additional $6.50 after tax each year. Discounted at 6.5%,
that cash flow has a present value of $100, pushing P’s maximum bid to
$1,000,100. In such a circumstance, P’s small advantage in managing the
candidate investment means that it will be able to outbid N, even though P
is taxed at 35% and N is tax exempt. Alternatively, if N can squeeze the
53. The calculation in the text can be expressed more generally. Let the annual beforetax cash flow from the candidate investment be c and the before-tax interest rate on the
benchmark asset be r. In that case, the present value (PV) of the candidate investment to a
tax-exempt investor, PV(N), is as follows: PV(N) = c/r.
54. This calculation can also be expressed more generally. Denote the tax rate paid by
the taxable owner as t. Thus, the taxable owner earns c(1 − t) on the candidate investment
and earns r(1 − t) on the benchmark asset. Thus, the present value of the candidate
investment to the taxable owner, PV(P), is as follows: PV(P) = c(1 − t)/r(1 − t) = c/r.
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additional $10 in before-tax cash flow from the candidate investment, but P
cannot, then N will be able to outbid P by $100. In this example, therefore,
whoever can generate more before-tax cash flow from an asset can outbid
the other party for that asset. In other words, relative tax rates are irrelevant
in determining how much a party will bid to acquire an asset. Thus, the
charitable exemption, although it increases the cash flow of nonprofits
relative to that of for-profit firms, it does not provide nonprofits with a taxinduced advantage over for-profit firms so long as the charitable exemption
applies across the board to all investments that nonprofits make.
As the principal example above illustrates, the asset is worth the same in
the hands of N and P, even though their after-tax cash flows differ. The
reason why the asset is worth the same amount to N and to P, in spite of
their different after-tax cash flows, is because the tax affects the transaction
in two opposite and offsetting ways. First, and most obviously, N’s tax
exemption increases N’s cash flow relative to P’s. Second, and not as
obviously, N’s tax exemption also increases N’s cash flow from any
alternative investments N might make with those funds. The first effect
tends to increase the value that N places on the investment; the second
effect tends to reduce that value. Because the two effects exactly offset one
another, there is no difference in the value that N and P place on the
investment. Therefore, in the example, N does not enjoy an advantage in
competitiveness over P in spite of being exempt from tax.
Although the two effects of the tax exemption are equal and operate in
opposite directions, they are not equally salient. The first effect—the
reduction in cash flow—is more salient than the second—the reduction in
return from alternative investments. Start with the first effect. The
consequences of being taxed are, with time, very clear. Whether P is an
individual or a corporation, the tax liability of the investment through P will
often be evident from the annual return that P files. The bite those taxes
take will also be evident from the tax payments that P or the investors in P
make. Thus, the immediate impact to investors in P of subjecting the
income from that investment to tax will be clear to those individuals
involved in P, to those involved in N, and to many others who have no
relation to N or P.
In contrast, the second effect—the reduction in return on alternative
investments foregone—is largely hidden from view. The other investment
is not made by the party that acquires the candidate investment. For the
other party, it is not common for investors to think of one investment as the
result of not making another investment. More generally, each party does
not see the other party’s investments, let alone the investments they forego
and the tax consequences to the other party of the investments they do not
make. In addition, the parties do not know what hurdle rate the other party
uses for investments.55 Moreover, there is no transaction or payment to
55. In practice, hurdle rates are further obscured by risk, which differs across assets and
is often difficult to measure. The discussion in this essay ignores risk.
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point to that illustrates or makes clear the effect of the reduction in return on
alternative investments. The argument can be understood and even
illustrated, but it is not readily observed in the world. It has, thus, been
widely ignored.56
The discussion above assumed that both N and P financed the purchase
of the candidate investment using cash on hand. That might not be the case.
First, it might be possible for P, but not for N, to finance the acquisition of
the asset by issuing equity. That is because N is prohibited by the
nondistribution constraint from issuing equity.57 Of course, P can issue
equity. P, however, must presumably pay any equity investors the same
10% on their investment.58 Thus, using only the investment to repay the
loan, P can at most raise $1 million, and in order to raise that amount P
must give up the entire cash flow stream from the investment. Thus, with
outside equity, the investment is still worth $1 million to P.59
Second, both N and P can issue debt to outsiders to fund that investment.
Assume both N and P can issue debt that pays interest at 10%. In that case,
N can use the proceeds from the asset to pay the interest on $1 million of
debt—$100,000 a year. Thus, the possibility of raising funds through
market-rate debt does not increase the value of the asset to N.60 As for P, P
can also use the proceeds from the asset to pay the interest on $1 million of
debt. Although P has only $65,000 after tax from the asset, the interest P
pays on the debt is tax deductible. Thus, P can borrow $1 million and pay
out $100,000 in interest. Because the interest is deductible by P, it offsets
P’s income from the asset. Thus, if P borrows to purchase the asset, P can
again bid $1 million for the asset.61
The above example shows that the exemption of nonprofits from tax did
not provide them with a tax-based competitive advantage relative to forprofit firms. That raises the question, What is the effect of the UBIT on the
competitiveness of nonprofits? For example, it might be thought that
subjecting nonprofits to tax through the UBIT will not reduce their

56. The argument has not been totally missed. Similar arguments have been made by
others. See, e.g., William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. Rev.
13, 61–68 (1972).
57. For a proposal to allow charities to issue equity and in effect become for-profit
enterprises, see Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities (Univ. of
Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 304 (2d Series), 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=928976.
58. Assume for now that P is a pass-through entity for tax purposes. The possibility of a
corporate P is taken up later. See infra Part IV.A.
59. I ignore risk, which would complicate the exposition markedly, but should not
change the qualitative results substantially. For a discussion of how to adjust tax-based
calculations for risk, see Scholes et al., supra note 52, at 127–30.
60. I discuss both leveraged investments and the possibility of issuing tax-exempt debt
in detail below.
61. The result reported in the text—that if P borrows to purchase the asset, the most P
can bid for the asset is still $1 million—holds whether P is taxed as a separate corporation or
as a pass-through entity.
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competitiveness. After all, the higher tax on nonprofit firms did not affect
their competitiveness.
Returning to the example, assume that N would be subject to the UBIT,
which is assessed at 35%, if it acquired the candidate investment. N would
report $100,000 of unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) and will pay
$35,000 in tax. Thus, N would be left with the same $65,000 as P from the
investment. That is the intent behind the UBIT and the sense in which it
levels the playing field. However—and this is the key—the UBIT does not
change N’s discount rate. Because N still pays no tax on its other
investments, including portfolio investments and investments in related
businesses, N still uses a 10% discount rate. That is because N can
continue to invest excess funds in the market, where N will earn 10% both
before and after tax. Thus, the present value of the candidate investment to
N assuming that N is subject to the UBIT, PV(NUBIT), is given by the
following equation:62
(3)

PV(NUBIT) = $65,000/.1 = $650,000

N, therefore, will value an asset subject to the UBIT less than P will
value the same asset. In an environment where N is subject to the UBIT,
the UBIT will provide P with an advantage in competitiveness. That
advantage exists even though N and P both earn the same amount from the
candidate investment on an after-tax basis. P’s relative advantage arises
because N is taxed more heavily on the candidate investment than on other
investments. That higher tax rate reduces the value of the candidate
investment to N relative to other investments available to N. It therefore
follows that, rather than eliminating a tax-induced competitive advantage,
the UBIT creates one. Instead of putting for-profit and nonprofit
competitors on an equal footing, the UBIT disadvantages nonprofit
competitors relative to for-profit competitors in the competition for
unrelated businesses. The UBIT, thus, tilts what would otherwise be a level
playing field between for-profit firms and nonprofits to the advantage of
for-profit firms and to the disadvantage of nonprofits.
IV. EXTENSIONS
This part considers several extensions of the analysis given above. First,
this part looks at situations where assets are subject to different tax rates. In
such circumstances, there can be tax-induced advantages and disadvantages
in competitiveness. Moreover, depending on the tax treatment of the asset,
the advantage might belong to the tax-exempt nonprofit or to the competing
taxable for-profit entity. Second, this part considers the exemption from
property taxes at the state and local level. Such an exemption will not
provide nonprofits with an advantage in acquiring such assets if the tax base
62. Expressed more generally, the present value of the candidate investment to the
nonprofit if the investment is subject to the UBIT, PV(NUBIT), is as follows: PV(NUBIT) =
c(1 − t)/r. That is obviously less than PV(N) = PV(P) = c/r when t is positive.
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is very broad. However, it will provide nonprofits with an advantage in
acquiring such assets if the tax base is narrow. Also, the UBIT is poorly
designed to offset that advantage. Third, this part looks at a provision in the
tax law that sweeps debt-financed assets within the UBIT. The essay shows
that borrowing at market interest rates by issuing taxable debt does not
provide a nonprofit borrower with a competitive advantage over its forprofit competitors. Fourth, the essay considers the possibility of nonprofits
borrowing through the use of private activity bonds. Private activity bonds
are tax exempt to the holder and so typically pay lower interest rates than
taxable bonds. When such bonds finance investment at the margin, they
can provide nonprofits with a competitive advantage. There are, however,
hurdles to their use.
A. Differentially Taxed Investments
There are several explicit and implicit assumptions that are behind the
conclusion that the exemption from taxation granted to § 501(c)(3) entities
does not provide those entities with a competitive advantage over taxable
competitors. One important assumption that was not made explicit above is
that the candidate investment is taxed in the same manner as the benchmark
asset (the investment each party would make with excess funds). This part
considers the consequence for competitiveness of the tax exemption when
not all investments are taxed the same.
In order to give more content to the notion of being taxed the same, use
the concept of the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The EMTR of an
investment is the present value of all future taxes on an investment divided
by the present value of the before-tax return on that investment.63 If the
EMTRs on two investments are equal, then the two investments are taxed
the same. If they are not equal, then the investment with the higher EMTR
has the heavier tax burden. In the previous parts, the hypothetical assumed
that the candidate investment and the benchmark asset had the same EMTR
for both N and P.64
In most cases, the EMTR for an asset is a function of who owns that
asset. For example, the EMTR of the candidate investment in the hands of
N is zero. That is obvious because N is not subject to tax. However, the
same investment in the hands of P has an EMTR of 35%. That 35% is
calculated as follows: Each year, the investment generates $100,000 cash.
That cash is taxed at 35% and so P’s annual tax payment is $35,000. The
present value of a perpetual stream of $35,000 discounted at 10% is
$350,000. That present value has to be compared to the present value of the
before-tax stream.
Each year, the investment generates $100,000.
Discounted at 10%, the cash flow stream has a present value of $1 million.
Thus, the ratio of the present value of P’s tax to the present value of the
63. See Scholes et al., supra note 52, at 184.
64. As used in this essay, the term “effective marginal tax rate” (EMTR) excludes
implicit taxes.
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before-tax cash flow stream from the asset is the quotient of $350,000 and
$1 million or 35%. Note that if P can invest excess funds at 10% with the
interest fully taxable, then P will earn 6.5% after tax and have an EMTR of
35% on such investments. Similarly, because N is exempt, it earns 10%
both before and after tax on the candidate investment, and N has an EMTR
of zero on both investments. Thus, for both N and P, the candidate and
benchmark investments have the same EMTR, even though the EMTR
differs depending upon who is holding the investment. Under those
conditions, the candidate investment is worth the same to both N and P.
In the example given above, the EMTR always equaled the statutory tax
rate. That, however, is not always the case. For many investments, the
EMTR differs from the statutory tax rate. Specifically, assets that are taxed
more heavily than the benchmark asset—either because they are subject to a
higher tax rate, more than the full amount of income is taxed, or the income
is taxed before it is earned—will have an EMTR above the statutory rate.
Conversely, assets that are taxed less heavily than the benchmark asset—
either because they are subject to a lower tax rate, some of the income is
excluded from tax, or the income is deferred—will have an EMTR below
the statutory rate. Thus, when the candidate investment is either an
overtaxed or under taxed asset (relative to the benchmark asset), the value
of that asset to the taxpayer will differ as the taxpayer’s tax rate changes. In
such circumstances, taxes can affect competitiveness.
Assume, for example, that the candidate investment is exempt from tax.
Accordingly, anyone who holds the candidate investment will not have to
pay tax on the income generated by that asset. Thus, if the asset is held by
N or P, the owner will receive $100,000 a year exempt from tax.
Obviously, the candidate investment is taxed differently than other assets in
the economy, where the owner must include the income from the asset in
taxable income and pay tax on that income at the owner’s own tax rate
(which is 35% for P and zero for N).
For N, exempting the income from the candidate investment from tax has
no effect on N’s cash flow from holding that asset. Thus, N will still value
that asset at $1 million.
Consider P. Exempting the income from the candidate investment from
tax will increase P’s after-tax cash flow. If P owns the candidate
investment, P will receive $100,000 a year after tax, which is a $35,000
increase in after-tax cash flow compared with owning an otherwise identical
taxable asset. Because P earns only 6.5% after tax on other investments,
the present value of the candidate investment to P, PV(Puntaxed), is given by
the following formula:65
65. Expressed more generally, the present value of an untaxed investment to P,
PV(Puntaxed), is as follows: PV(Puntaxed) = c/r(1 − t). That is obviously greater than PV(N) =
PV(P) = c/r when t is positive. More generally still, assume that only the portion a of the
income from the asset is taxed, or that the asset is taxed at the rate at. Such an asset is under
taxed if a is less than one and overtaxed if a is greater than one. The present value of the
differentially taxed investment to P, PV(Pdifferentially taxed), is as follows: PV(Pdifferentially taxed) =
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PV(Puntaxed) = $100,000/.065 = $1,538,462

Thus, the candidate investment is worth more than $1.5 million to P.
Accordingly, because the candidate investment is worth only $1 million to
N, in a competition between N and P for the tax-exempt candidate
investment, P will outbid N. In such a case, N’s tax exemption is actually a
hindrance to N, not a help. Thus, in competing for an untaxed asset, the tax
exemption of nonprofits is not a source of competitive advantage, but of
disadvantage.
More generally, high-bracket taxpayers have an advantage over lowbracket taxpayers when the competition is over assets taxed less heavily
than the benchmark asset. That result is well-known in the tax law. It is an
example of a clientele effect. High-bracket taxpayers will bid up the price
of under-taxed assets. The resulting higher price translates into a reduced
return. Such a reduction in return is called an implicit tax.66 In selecting
assets, buyers trade off implicit and explicit taxes. The higher a party’s
explicit tax rate, the more attractive it finds replacing explicit taxes with
implicit taxes. Conversely, the lower a party’s explicit tax rate, the less
attractive it finds replacing explicit taxes with implicit taxes.67
Over the years, techniques have been developed that separate the tax
benefits from owning an asset from the use of an asset. One of the simplest
and most effective of such techniques is a capital lease. If the exemption
from tax is for the benefit of the owner of the asset (not the user), then highbracket investors will often find it attractive to hold title to assets taxed at
reduced rates and to lease those assets to low-bracket parties that can get the
most value out of using those assets, but which do not value the tax benefits
as much as the high-bracket investors value those benefits. To the extent
that leasing is inexpensive, easy, and effective in transferring tax benefits,
tax considerations will tend to be irrelevant in determining who will use an
asset in business. The party who can make the best use of the asset will use
it, although another party might hold title.
Arguably, in such
circumstances, tax considerations have little impact on competitiveness
because they do not determine who uses an asset, only who holds title.68
Conversely, if leasing is expensive and difficult, it will not be effective, and
so, in transferring tax benefits, tax considerations will tend to play a large
role in determining who uses a given asset.69
There are numerous examples of under-taxed assets. These include
assets for which depreciation, amortization, or depletion exceed economic
depreciation. Because economic depreciation is often very slow, most
assets that can be depreciated, amortized, or depleted are under taxed. In

c(1 − at)/r(1 − t). That is obviously greater than PV(N) = PV(P) = c/r when t is positive and
a is less than one.
66. See Scholes et al., supra note 52, at 125–27.
67. See id. at 130–32.
68. See Knoll, supra note 11.
69. See David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 113 (1986).
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such circumstances, the tax system will generally encourage high-bracket
taxpayers to own those assets. Thus, for under-taxed assets, the tax-induced
competitive advantage does not go to tax-exempt and low-bracket bidders
as one would naturally assume, but instead it counterintuitively belongs to
the high-bracket bidders.
The consequences are the reverse if the asset is overtaxed (that is to say,
for taxpayers with positive tax rates, the candidate investment has a higher
EMTR than the statutory tax rate). Assume, for example, that the owner of
the candidate investment has to pay tax on double the income (or at twice
the normal statutory rate). Thus, N and P will pay tax on $200,000 income
from the asset. That will have no effect on N with a tax rate of zero. Thus,
N will continue to receive $100,000 after tax from the investment. P,
however, will be adversely affected. P will have to pay $70,000 tax, and so
P will be left with only $30,000 from the investment after tax. Obviously, P
could do better depositing the $1 million purchase price in the bank. P will
receive $100,000 interest, pay $35,000 tax, and so P will be left with
$65,000. P will view the investment as no more valuable than a bank
account that generates $30,000 a year in after-tax interest. The present
value of such an investment to P, PV(Povertaxed), is given by the following
formula:70
(5)

PV(Povertaxed) = $30,000/.065 = $461,538

Thus, the most that P will pay for the candidate investment is roughly
$460,000. Accordingly, if the asset is up for bid, N, which still values the
investment at $1 million, will outbid P.
Once again, the result is an example of a clientele effect. The overtaxed
asset generates a negative implicit tax, sometimes called an implicit
subsidy.71 If P sets the price so that N will buy the asset at just above
$461,538, then the asset will return almost 22% to N. In effect, N is
receiving a negative subsidy for taking on a tax obligation that does not
harm N.
The literature discusses more frequently positive implicit taxes than
negative implicit taxes (or implicit subsidies).72 There is, however, one
prominent and very important example of negative implicit taxes. That
example is for assets held in corporate form through equity.73 The income
70. Expressed more generally, the present value of the differentially taxed investment to
P, PV(Pdifferentially taxed), is as follows: PV(Pdifferentially taxed) = c(1 − at)/r(1 − t). That is
obviously less than PV(N) = PV(P) = c/r when t is positive and a is greater than one.
71. In a series of articles, I argue that negative implicit taxes are the key to
understanding the cross-border, dividend-stripping transactions in Compaq Computer Corp.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), and IES Industries v.
United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). See Michael S. Knoll, Implicit Taxes and Pretax
Profit in Compaq and IES Industries, 114 Tax Notes 679 (2007); Michael S. Knoll, Compaq
Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of Pre-tax Profit, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 821 (2007).
72. Scholes mentions implicit negative taxes only in a footnote. See Scholes et al., supra
note 52, at 125 n.4.
73. There is extensive finance literature that shows that some assets can support
proportionately more debt than other assets.
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from such assets incurs two levels of tax—the corporate level and the
individual level. The top statutory corporate level tax is also the maximum
individual statutory tax rate on ordinary income—35%.74 Assets held
through corporate equity are also taxed to the individual when stock is sold
or dividends are received. The top tax rates for dividends and capital gains
today are 15%.75 That tax, however, can be deferred. Thus, the top federal
tax rate on investments held through corporate equity is, at most, nearly
45% (44.75%). That exceeds the 35% tax rate for the benchmark asset.
Thus, for corporate assets financed by equity, tax considerations provide
nonprofits with a tax-induced incentive to hold such assets.
Return to the example and assume that the combined (individual and
corporate) tax rate if P owns the candidate investment is 44.75%. In that
case, P will pay $44,750 in taxes and be left with $55,250 a year. The
present value of the asset to P when the asset is held through corporate
equity, PV(Pcorp equity), is calculated as follows:76
(6)

PV(Pcorp equity) = $55,250/.0625 = $850,000

The value of the candidate investment to P when it is held through
corporate equity is $850,000.77 Thus, the most P will bid for the investment
is $850,000.
In contrast, the investment is still worth $1 million to N if N can hold it
directly and avoid both levels of tax.78 Thus, for assets that for-profit
owners will hold through corporate equity, nonprofits will have a taxinduced competitive advantage over their for-profit rivals. That advantage,
however, is not simply due to the exemption from tax enjoyed by
nonprofits. It is instead a combination of that advantage and the
overtaxation of such investments. If the overtaxation of investments
financed through corporate equity is removed, then the nonprofit’s
advantage disappears.
Moreover, the UBIT is a very blunt instrument to offset the advantage
enjoyed by nonprofits for investments financed with corporate equity. The
UBIT, which subjects the entire investment to tax at the corporate rate,
places nonprofits at a disadvantage. Returning to the example, N receives
$100,000 income annually. That income is UBIT taxable at 35%. After
paying $35,000 tax, N is left with $65,000 each year. The present value to
74. I.R.C. § 1 (2000).
75. Id. § 1(h). In the discussion that follows, I ignore the possibility of deferral.
76. The calculation in equation (6) can also be expressed more generally. To do so,
denote the second level tax, usually thought of as the individual level tax on dividends and
capital gains, as t2. The present value of the candidate investment to P when it is held
through corporate equity, PV(Pcorp equity), is as follows: PV(Pcorp equity) = c(1 − t)(1 − t2)/r(1 − t) =
c(1 − t2)/r. That is obviously less than PV(N) = PV(P) = c/r when t2 is positive.
77. The federal corporate tax rate is 35%. The federal individual tax rate is 15% on
dividends and capital gains. Because the individual level tax is on income after the payment
of corporate level tax, the incremental tax due to the individual level tax is 9.75%. That
incremental tax liability is calculated as follows: 9.75% = (1 − 35%)(15%).
78. It is worth much less (only $650,000) to N if N can only hold some shares, and so
the corporate tax still must be paid.
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N of a perpetuity paying $65,000 a year, PV(NUBIT), which was calculated
in equation (3), is $650,000.
Thus, the present value of the candidate investment to N—$650,000—is
substantially less than the present value of the candidate investment to P—
$850,000. Thus, when the asset is held by for-profit investors through
corporate equity, the UBIT imposes too much tax on N, more than
offsetting N’s advantage, and thereby leaving N at a disadvantage relative
to P.
As the example above suggests, N’s advantage over P when the
competition is for assets held through corporate equity is not because P
pays tax when N does not. N has an advantage over P when competing for
such investments because P pays a higher tax on such assets than on the
benchmark asset, whereas N pays the same tax on both investments. That is
to say, P’s disadvantage is a result of the additional tax that P pays on
investments held through corporate equity. 79 That disadvantage is roughly
the difference in P’s tax rates between the candidate investment and the
benchmark asset.
The discussion above suggests two alternative means of leveling the
playing field between for-profit firms and nonprofits. The first and most
obvious method is to eliminate the differential treatment of assets generally
and, in particular, the disadvantageous tax treatment of investments
financed through corporate equity. For example, by integrating the
corporate and individual tax systems into a single tax system that imposes
the same total tax rate on corporate and noncorporate investments, Congress
could eliminate the need for the UBIT.80
Second, the UBIT could be reformed and tailored to offset the advantage
enjoyed by nonprofits over for-profit firms when the latter hold investments
through corporate equity. Such a UBIT would tax nonprofits in order to
eliminate the advantage that they would otherwise enjoy on investments
made through corporate equity.
Unfortunately, there is no simple and general solution to what the UBIT
tax rate should be in such circumstances. However, in one special case,
there is a simple solution. That occurs when the asset is a (constant)
perpetuity, the individual tax on the taxable investor is a fixed percentage of
79. Although our conclusions are similar—without the UBIT, nonprofits would
generally have a tax-induced advantage in the competition to acquire assets held by forprofit investors through corporations—the analysis in the text differs from that of Hansmann,
supra note 34, at 610. Nonprofits have a tax-induced incentive to acquire for-profit
businesses, but not because their cash flows would exceed those earned by taxable buyers, as
Hansmann argues. Instead, nonprofits have an incentive to acquire businesses that would
generate large amounts of income taxed at both the corporate and individual level because
high-bracket investors pay a higher total tax rate on such investments than on the benchmark
asset, whereas nonprofits pay the same tax (zero) on both investments.
80. For a discussion of different methods of integrating the corporate and personal
income taxes, see, for example, Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of the
U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: The Treasury Department and American Law
Institute Reports (1998).
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the income remaining after paying the corporate tax, and the corporate tax
rate equals the individual tax rate on noncorporate investments. In that
case, the UBIT should be at the same rate as the individual tax on corporate
investments.
To illustrate, return to the example of a perpetuity that pays $100,000 a
year. Assume the additional tax is a 15% tax on the income remaining after
paying the 35% corporate tax.81 If P buys the asset and pays both taxes, P
will have $65,000 after payment of the corporate tax. That $65,000 is
subject to an additional 15% tax. Thus, P will pay an additional $9,750 for
a total tax payment of $44,750. That will leave P with $55,250. The
corresponding present value of the asset to P, PV(Prev UBIT), is given by the
following formula:82
(7)

PV(Prev UBIT) = $55,250/.065 = $850,000

If N is subject to UBIT at 15%, then N will pay $15,000 a year and is left
with $85,000. Discounted at 10%, the asset then is worth $850,000 to N.
Thus, applying a 15% UBIT to N offsets the benefit that N would otherwise
enjoy by virtue of a second level tax at 15% (on top of the basic 35% tax
rate) over P.83
The above result has several implications for the UBIT. First, there is an
argument to be made that nonprofits have a tax-induced competitive
advantage when competing against for-profits to acquire assets that are
otherwise held by for-profit firms through corporate equity. The advantage
arises because for-profit investors are overtaxed on such investments and
therefore devalue them. Second, the UBIT that offsets that advantage is
roughly equal to the second level tax on that portion of the investment that
is equity financed. Third, the above analysis makes clear that the existing
UBIT is generally too high and so disadvantages nonprofits relative to forprofit firms.84 Fourth, the analysis above suggests that given current tax
rates the UBIT tax rate should be set as the product of the individual tax on
81. Because of the commutative property of multiplication, the total tax burden with flat
taxes is the same whether state taxes are deductible from federal income or federal taxes are
deductible from state income.
82. More generally, when the differential tax on the candidate investment takes the form
of a second level tax on after-tax income at the rate t2, then, if the UBIT is assessed at that
second rate, the present value of the candidate investment to N, PV(Nrev UBIT), is as follows:
PV(Nrev UBIT) = c(1 − t2)/r. That is obviously equal to PV(Pcorp equity). Note that if the second
tax takes the form of an additional tax on before-tax income at the rate t′, then the UBIT tax
rate, t2, should be assessed at the rate t2 = t′/(1 − t).
83. This result is easy to see algebraically. The present value of a perpetuity that pays c
annually when the interest rate is r and the tax rate in the economy and on the asset are both t
is just PV = c(1 − t)/r(1 − t) = c/r. If there is a second level tax on the after tax income at the
rate t2, then the value of the asset is given by PV = c(1 − t)(1 − t2)/r(1 − t) = c(1 − t2)/r. The
value of that asset to a tax-exempt nonprofit, PV(N), is PV(N) = c/r. If the UBIT is at the
rate t2, then the value of the asset to the nonprofit is given by PV(N) = c(1 − t2)/r, which is
also the value to the for-profit entity.
84. It is too high because it uses the corporate tax rate, not the capital gains/dividends
tax rate, and because it applies to the entire business, not the portion that would be financed
by corporate equity.
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corporate income, 15%, and the share of such assets financed by equity.
The latter number obviously will have to be an approximation. It might be
set across industries generally or industry by industry.
B. The Exemption from Property and Other Taxes
The discussion so far of the consequences for competitiveness of the
UBIT and of the exemption from tax enjoyed by § 501(c)(3) entities has
focused exclusively on the federal income tax. State tax laws also
frequently exempt charities from various state taxes. To the extent that
states have income tax systems that are similar to the federal income tax
system, including the exemption of charities from tax, the analysis given
above under the federal income tax also applies to state income taxes.
However, the introduction of states changes the nature of the taxes and
hence the nature of the exemption.
In 2003 to 2004, state and local governments collected over $300 billion
in property taxes.85 After the sales tax, the property tax is the largest source
of tax revenue to state and local governments.86 The property tax generates
more revenue for the states than do the individual and corporate income
taxes combined.87 Yet most states exempt charities from property taxes.88
This section looks at the consequences for competitiveness of states
exempting charitable nonprofits from property taxes.
A property tax is a form of wealth tax. An income tax imposes a tax on
the income earned by a taxpayer over a period of time, typically a year. A
wealth tax assesses tax based on a taxpayer’s wealth at a certain point in
time. In the jargon of economics, an income tax is a tax on a flow and a
wealth tax is a tax on a stock. The two concepts are related in that a stock
of wealth produces a flow of income and a flow (or series of flows) has a
present value, which is a stock. Thus, an income tax is similar to a wealth
tax.89 However, in order for both taxes to impose a similar burden, the
wealth tax should be assessed at a rate equal to the product of the income
tax rate and the market interest rate. In terms of the example (where the

85. Economic Report of the President: 2007 Report Spreadsheet Tables, State and Local
Government Revenues and Expenditures, Selected Fiscal Years, 1938–2004, tbl.B-86,
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/B86.xls.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 139, 144
(2007) (“[C]harities . . . are largely eligible for state . . . property tax exemptions.”); David E.
Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 531, 533 (2006) (describing
the property tax exemption accorded nonprofits as one of the cornerstones of U.S. nonprofit
tax law); Richard D. Pomp, Revise the Property-Tax Exemption, 14 Chron. of Philanthropy,
May 2, 2002, at 37 (“Most states grant property-tax exemptions for charities.”).
89. For thoughtful discussions of the similarities and differences between a wealth tax
and an income tax, see Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53
Tax L. Rev. 423, 435–41 (2000); David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive
Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L. Rev. 499, 500–31 (2000).

880

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

interest rate is 10%), a wealth tax at a rate of 3.5% is similar to an income
tax at a rate of 35%.90
It follows from the discussion above (which was in the context of an
income tax, but which applies as well to a wealth tax) that exempting
charities from the obligation to pay property taxes would not provide them
with an advantage over for-profit entities if the property tax was part of a
comprehensive wealth tax. Such a tax would have to be universal, applying
to all forms of wealth—tangible, intangible, financial, and real—without
limitation, and impose an equal burden on property and other forms of
wealth.91 If all wealth were taxed at the same rate, nonprofits would not
have a tax-induced incentive to prefer to hold some assets and to avoid
holding other assets. It is because only a small portion of wealth is subject
to property taxes (in many jurisdictions only real property is subject to
property tax) that the exemption of nonprofits creates an incentive for
nonprofits to hold real property. The logic, which is as above, is that assets
subject to property taxes are overtaxed relative to other assets. That creates
an incentive for high-bracket taxpayers (e.g., for-profit entities and
individuals) to avoid assets subject to property taxes and for low-bracket
taxpayers (e.g., nonprofits) to hold them.92 That incentive is likely to
manifest itself by nonprofits using more real estate in their exempt activities
than otherwise and acquiring commercial real estate that they lease to
tenants.
The obvious policy response to nonprofits acquiring and leasing
commercial real estate is to limit the property tax exemption to property
that nonprofits use in their exempt function. An economist’s more general
response, which also addresses the advantage that nonprofits have in
acquiring real estate for use in their exempt function, might be to advise
governments to be more evenhanded in taxing different assets. A real
property tax is too narrow because it invites just this kind of planning to
exploit clientele effects.
Furthermore, any advantage in competitiveness that nonprofits enjoy as a
result of their exemption from state and local property taxes is a tenuous
basis on which to justify the UBIT. The tax liability from the UBIT poorly
matches up against any advantage provided by the states through the
property tax exemption. The UBIT is at a flat rate, generally 35%, whereas
90. The wealth tax rate is calculated as follows: 3.5% = 35% × 10%. Because a stock
of capital generates income at a rate of 10%, a wealth tax of 3.5% has the same expected
burden as an income tax of 35%.
91. Such a tax would also treat issued debt (borrowings) as a reduction in wealth.
92. This result can be expressed mathematically. Assume that a parcel of nondepreciable real estate produces a cash flow of c per period in perpetuity. If we denote the
before-tax interest rate by r and the tax rate paid by the taxable owner by t, then the charity
will value the real estate at c/r. Similarly, the taxable investor will value the real estate at
c(1 − t)/r(1 − t), which also equals c/r. If we denote the property tax by p, then the taxable
investor will value the property at [c(1 − t) − p]/r(1 − t), which equals c/(r − p)/r(1 − t). If,
however, the charity is exempt from the property tax, it will still value the property at c/r.
Thus, the charity will be able to outbid the taxable investor for the real estate.
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property tax rates vary from state to state and even across communities
within states. Also, the UBIT applies to the unrelated business income of
nonprofits regardless of source, whereas the exemption from property taxes
advantages only nonprofits that purchase property subject to tax (usually
only real estate) and only to the extent of such purchases.93
Moreover, protecting state treasuries from nonprofits that avoid state
property taxes by acquiring property that would be taxable if held by
individuals or for-profit entities is not a solid foundation for the UBIT.
First, it is unclear why a federal law is needed to protect state tax revenues.
The states can protect their revenues themselves if they think it necessary or
appropriate. Second, because the scope of the state property tax exemption
and the UBIT differ, the UBIT provides little protection to states; the UBIT
might even channel investment away from unrelated businesses into real
estate. Third, because the UBIT tax rate matches up so poorly with the tax
benefit from the state property tax exemption, there are costs from using the
UBIT. In effect, the UBIT is a penalty that increases the cost to nonprofits
of engaging in unrelated business activities. Accordingly, in order for a
nonprofit to engage in an activity where the UBIT applies, it must be more
efficient than the competing for-profit. When a more efficient nonprofit is
deterred by the UBIT from an unrelated business, there is a welfare cost.94
Finally, if Congress wanted to eliminate the tax savings and competitive
advantages enjoyed by nonprofits by virtue of the state property tax
exemption, it could require nonprofits to pay to the federal government an
amount equal to the tax saving from any state or local property tax
exemption. The UBIT, which is a wide-ranging and broad tax, is assessed
at too high of a tax rate and applies too broadly to address such a narrow
concern.
C. Debt-Financed Property
Although charitable institutions frequently operate commercial
businesses that compete with for-profit businesses, few charitable
institutions own and operate unrelated businesses with little or no
connection to their exempt activities. The days of Mueller appear to be
behind us. Of course, nonprofits still invest heavily in unrelated businesses,
but they do so indirectly. These investments generally take one of two
forms. First, wealthy nonprofits invest large portions of their endowments
in stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Second, many wealthy nonprofits invest
heavily in private equity funds, which invest directly in businesses, and

93. In addition, nonprofits might not even have an advantage in competitiveness from
the exemption. If, for example, the tax benefits of the exemption can be easily transferred
through leasing, then nonprofits do not have a substantial advantage in obtaining use of the
property, only title. See Knoll, supra note 11.
94. See Hansmann, supra note 16 (arguing the converse—that without the UBIT, the
exemption of nonprofits from the federal income tax will discourage mere efficient for-profit
firms, thereby imposing a welfare cost).
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hedge funds, which often invest in stocks.95 These funds are often located
offshore so that their nonprofit investors can avoid a provision in the UBIT
that would otherwise apply to many of these investments.96
The UBIT distinguishes between passive income, which is tax exempt,
and active income, which is subject to the UBIT if it is not related to the
charity’s exempt purpose. However, both passive income and related active
income are subject to the UBIT, under § 514, if the income is from debtfinanced assets.97 Debt-financed income is included in UBTI in the same
proportion that the property is financed by debt. Thus, if a covered
investment has a debt-to-basis ratio of three to four, then 75% of the
nonprofit’s income from that investment would be subject to the UBIT by
virtue of § 514. Because private equity and hedge funds often employ large
amounts of leverage, much of the profits earned by universities and other
charitable investors in these funds would be subject to UBIT if the funds
were located in the United States. By locating these funds offshore—and
introducing a blocking entity—nonprofits can avoid the debt-financed
UBIT rules of § 514.98
In 2007, these offshore strategies caught the attention of legislators, who,
in their search for additional sources of revenue, began eyeing universities’
investments in private equity funds and hedge funds.99 Viewing the
offshore location of these funds as a tax loophole, some legislators support
taxing charities on their profits from investments in private equity funds and
hedge funds that employ leverage.100
Enacted more than fifty years ago (and expanded significantly in 1969), §
514 was not aimed at charities’ investments in private equity and hedge
funds. Instead, § 514 was enacted in order to address a specific transaction
that was viewed as abusive. The transaction was a type of sale and
leaseback known as a charitable bootstrap. Critics argued that a charity
engaging in a charitable bootstrap was trading on its exemption by
borrowing to acquire property and using tax-free income to pay off the
debt.101 The charitable bootstrap is illustrated by a 1965 Supreme Court
case, Commissioner v. Brown.102

95. Other nonprofits, which are not themselves educational institutions, also invest in
private equity and hedge funds. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation has one-third of its
$3.7 billion endowment invested in such funds. Stephanie Strom, Nonprofits Face Threat to
a Tax Loophole, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2007, at A15.
96. Id.
97. The original 1950 Act contained a limited inclusion of income from debt-financed
property. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 substantially expanded the scope of that provision to
cover a much broader range of transactions.
98. See Andrew W. Needham & Christian Brause, Hedge Funds, 736 Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio (BNA), at A-4, A-46–A-48 (2007).
99. See Strom, supra note 95.
100. Id.
101. Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 580 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. Id.
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Simplifying somewhat, Clay Brown sold a closely held sawmill and
lumber business to a charitable organization for $1.3 million.103 A
negligible portion of that price was paid up front in cash.104 The balance
was to be paid over time. The latter obligation was evidenced by a ten-year,
nonrecourse note that bore no interest. The charity then leased the property
back to Brown. Brown agreed to pay 80% of his profits to the charity as
rent, and the charity agreed to pay Brown 90% of the rent it received as
payment on the notes. The Commissioner contended that the transaction
was not a sale for tax purposes and sought to tax Brown at ordinary income
tax rates. The Supreme Court, which accepted the lower courts’ finding
that the transaction was at a reasonable arm’s-length price, held for
Brown.105
Under the UBIT rules in effect at that time, the charity was not taxed on
the rental income that it received from Brown. For Brown, however, the
rent was an ordinary and necessary business expense, which reduced his
ordinary income from operating the sawmill to 20% of his profit. In
contrast, Brown claimed that the payments he received from the charity on
the note—$72 out of every $100—were capital gain in spite of being paid
out of operating profits. Moreover, because the note bore no interest,
Brown did not receive any interest income, which would have been
ordinary. Thus, the only ordinary income Brown had was from the 20% of
profits he did not pay to the charity on the lease. Putting together all of the
pieces, every $100 of pre-tax profit earned by Brown generated $8 for the
charity (untaxed), $72 of long-term capital gain, and $20 of ordinary
income. Assuming an ordinary income tax rate of 50% and a long-term
capital gains tax rate of 20%, Brown earned $68.60 after taxes. Had he
owned the saw mill directly, he would have earned only $50 after taxes.106
Thus, the transaction increased Brown’s after-tax income by 37%.
Critics looking at the Brown transaction saw a charity putting up no
money and receiving 8% of Brown’s pre-tax income in exchange for
allowing Brown to use its tax exemption. As described above, Brown
benefited from the transaction by converting 80% of his remaining income
into capital gain, thereby reducing his tax rate on that income substantially.
The tax savings from the charitable bootstrap concerned legislators and
commentators with an interest in protecting the U.S. Treasury. Critics also
argued that taxable owners, such as Brown, benefited by receiving above
market prices when they sold assets to nonprofits. The latter complaint,
that the charitable bootstrap inflated prices, raises questions of
competitiveness between nonprofits and for-profit buyers. Because the
103. The discussion in the text ignores Clay Brown’s partners.
104. Only $5000, which was paid out of the company’s assets, was immediately paid in
cash.
105. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 579.
106. At higher ordinary income tax rates, assuming that the long-term capital gains rate is
40% of the ordinary income tax rate, the tax benefit to the seller from the charitable
bootstrap is even larger.
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charitable bootstrap employs a tax-exempt purchaser, it appears to provide
nonprofits with a competitive advantage over for-profit entities in acquiring
productive assets.107
The latter concern, at least in part, appears to have motivated Congress to
enact § 514. The legislative history of § 514 expresses Congress’s concern
with unfair competition. In language reminiscent of Representative
Dingell’s famous remark about the macaroni monopoly, a 1950 committee
report asserted that, if the charitable bootstrap were allowed to continue
unchecked, “exempt organizations in the not-too-distant-future may own
the great bulk of the commercial and industrial real estate in the
country.”108
In determining whether the charitable bootstrap provided nonprofits with
a tax-induced competitive advantage over their for-profit competitors, one
must be careful to distinguish actual price increases from merely apparent
ones. The face amount of the note in Brown is an apparent purchase price.
The charity did not pay $1.3 million for the sawmill. There are several
problems with taking that price at face value. First, it ignores time value of
money because the note carries no interest. Second, although the courts
held that $1.3 million was a reasonable arm’s-length price for the sawmill,
it need not have been. The sale price was linked to the lease payments, and
it was in Brown’s interest to overstate both in order to convert more
ordinary income into capital gain. Such tax-induced exaggerations should
not be mistaken for actual increases in purchase prices.
In analyzing the charitable bootstrap, it is important to separate the tax
benefits, if any, of using debt from the tax benefits of exploiting other
provisions in the tax law. One also has to be careful to distinguish the
benefits from transacting with a tax-exempt purchaser as opposed to a
taxable purchaser. One factor that made the charitable bootstrap attractive
to Brown was that the note he held from the charity bore no interest.109
Because the note was without interest, no portion of the money Brown
received from the charity was taxable as ordinary income. That was clearly
attractive to Brown and the charity was indifferent, because it was tax
exempt, whether it paid a higher purchase price and no interest or a lower
price and interest. With a taxable purchaser, the substitution of purchase
price for interest might not have been as attractive. The higher purchase
price would have increased basis, which increases depreciation deductions
over time. Under reasonable assumptions, the value of the increased
deductions is less than the cost from the lost interest deductions. Under
such circumstances, a taxable buyer is worse off by substituting a higher
purchase price for interest.

107. Carla Neeley Freitag, Debt-Financed Income (Section 514), 875-2d Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio (BNA), at A-2 (2001).
108. S. Rep. No. 81-2375, at 30–31 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3084.
109. That failing has since been remedied by other provisions of the tax law.
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Nonetheless, the incentive to overstate purchase price is not confined to
sales to nonprofits. As long as the purchaser’s interest payments and the
seller’s lease payments are equal, neither party has ordinary income from
the transaction. Moreover, as the purchase price increases, so does the
purchaser’s basis. And with the increase in basis comes larger depreciation
deductions. If these depreciation deductions are accelerated relative to
actual declines in value,110 then the purchaser’s depreciation deductions
will generate a tax shelter, but only for a taxable investor.111 There is, thus,
a similar incentive for taxable buyers to overstate their purchase prices.112
Thus, at the end of the day, there was probably as great of an incentive to
inflate the purchase price with a tax-exempt buyer as with a taxable buyer.
Moreover, in the more than forty years since Brown, tax jurisprudence
has advanced markedly. There is much greater appreciation of what an
economically accurate tax system requires and the consequences of failing
to provide such a system. Today, a loan must bear interest and transactions
can be rigorously scrutinized for their legitimacy. Even without § 514, it is
very unlikely that a charitable bootstrap will be respected. Thus, the most
that can be said in favor of § 514 is that it might play a prophylactic role by
discouraging parties from even attempting to use the charitable bootstrap.
Even so, § 514 is too broad. It is not limited to the charitable bootstrap, but
applies to almost all debt-financed investments.113 That raises the question,
Is there an abuse when nonprofits acquire assets using debt financing?
As described in Part III, nonprofits do not have a tax-induced competitive
advantage, and hence there is no abuse when a nonprofit uses borrowed
funds to acquire an asset, the income from which is taxed each year at
ordinary rates. That is to say, a charity cannot profit from borrowing
money at a market interest rate, say 10% in the example, and investing it at
the same rate of return.114 As described in Part IV, nonprofits are at a taxinduced competitive disadvantage when they seek to acquire overtaxed
assets. That disadvantage remains when the asset is acquired using debt.
Thus, again, there is no abuse.
As described in Part IV, however, tax-exempt nonprofits have a taxinduced competitive advantage only when the competition is to acquire an
110. That is the case now and was the case at the time of Brown for most productive
assets.
111. The value of the shelter increases with the buyer’s tax rate. Furthermore, overstating
the sales price does not harm the seller as long as the seller can report gain using the
installment method without having to pay interest on the deferred gain.
112. The classic example is Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir.
1976). In Estate of Franklin, the owners of a motel transferred title to a group of doctors for
a small amount of cash and a large amount of seller-financed nonrecourse debt, which no
one expected to be repaid. The operators of the motel leased the facility back from the
doctors. The purpose behind the transaction was to increase the depreciation deductions
generated by the hotel markedly and to transfer those deductions to high-bracket taxpayers.
113. See William K.S. Wang, Apply UBIT to De Facto Leverage, But Not to ‘Spurious
Leverage,’ 95 Tax Notes 925 (2002) (arguing and criticizing § 514 for being so broad as to
apply to “spurious” leverage—debt that is offset by held bonds).
114. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 13, at 322–23.

886

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

overtaxed asset. The principal example is assets held in corporate form that
are financed through equity. A second example, which is described in Part
IV, is real estate on which the nonprofit does not have to pay property tax,
but on which a for-profit owner would have to pay tax.
Start with the first example. The advantage that nonprofits have in
acquiring corporate assets only exists for equity-financed assets; there is no
such advantage with debt-financed assets. Presumably, if a nonprofit can
finance an asset with debt, so can a competing for-profit corporation. In
both cases, the income is passed through to the bondholder as interest.
Thus, the ability to leverage a corporate investment does not leverage the
nonprofit’s tax-induced advantage in competitiveness, but instead dissipates
it.
Consider the second example. The exemption of charities from the
property tax creates an incentive for such tax-exempt entities to acquire real
estate that would otherwise be subject to the property tax through debt.
Because that benefit—the property tax exemption—is tied to ownership,
charitable purchasers of real estate can leverage that benefit by applying
their exemption to as much real estate as possible. In effect, charities can
purchase real estate and receive additional (tax-exempt) cash flow because
they are exempt from property taxes. And the more leverage they use, the
more real estate they can own, and so the larger is their total cash flow.115
Of course, with risk, leverage usually increases. The tax benefit enjoyed
by charities and their need to manage risk encourage charities to lease the
property they own under long-term leveraged leases. In a typical leveraged
lease, the owner borrows a large portion of the purchase price. The owner
also leases the property for a long term to a third party. The lease payments
are usually set in advance so that the rent covers the interest and principal
on the loan and provides the lessor with a largely preset return on its
investment, which might be minimal.116
Such long-term leveraged leases not only ensure that the party who can
best use the property controls the asset, but they also reduce the risk to the
nonprofit lessor.117 Such long-term leases are widely recognized by
115. Although charitable investors have an advantage when competing against for-profit
investors for real estate subject to property taxes, the existence of such an advantage does not
mean that they will own all the real estate. There are numerous factors that limit their
ownership of real estate. First, charities’ investment funds are limited and they are prevented
from raising equity because of the non-distribution constraint. Second, another party might
be a more efficient owner, manager, or user of real estate. That will allow it to increase its
bid relative to the less efficient nonprofit. Third, charities like other investors are careful to
diversify their investments. Holding an undiversified portfolio of assets increases risk
exposure without compensation. Fourth, lenders are usually reluctant to lend the full
purchase price of an asset.
116. If the rent escalates, it is usually based on a set schedule or set to an index, such as
the consumer price index (a measure of inflation).
117. If the lessee is creditworthy, then the only risk borne by the lessor is the risk
associated with the change in the property’s value at the end of the lease. If the lease is
sufficiently long, then the present value of the residual is small and so the risk is small. If
the lessor is not as creditworthy, then the risk is the joint risk that the property declines in
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economists as a substitute for owning the property and issuing debt against
it.118 The lessor’s risk can be further reduced by having the lessor borrower
nonrecourse against the property. In that case, the risk of nonpayment is
borne by a lender, which presumably is also willing to lend against the
property when it is owned by the lessee. The lessor’s risk can also be
mitigated when the lessee is the original owner and the property is sold to
the lessor in order to engage in a sale-leaseback. If the seller is also the
lender, then the lessor can reduce its risk by not having to invest cash in the
property.
Although nonprofits can increase their competitive advantage in
obtaining title to real estate by using leverage, that is a tenuous basis on
which to justify either § 511 or § 514. First, the advantage exists in a small
range of situations, whereas the tax provisions are very broad. Second,
depending upon how effective leasing is in transferring the use as well as
the benefits and burdens of ownership, the advantage might only go to
acquiring title. The advantage might do little to advance either economic
ownership or use. Third, there are narrower solutions. Once again, a better
solution would be to eliminate the overtaxation of certain assets. Barring
that, another alternative that is still better than the existing UBIT would be
to redesign the UBIT to capture the advantage that exists with overtaxed
assets. Because the only significant example where nonprofits can use debt
to leverage their tax exemption is real estate subject to a property tax, a
simple solution would be for states to deny the exemption when the
property is leased.
As discussed above, nonprofits can use debt financing to leverage the
benefit of their exemption from tax. However, that only provides them with
an advantage in acquiring overtaxed property (higher EMTR). It does not
provide them with an advantage when the candidate investment is taxed the
same as the benchmark asset (same EMTR). And the advantage goes in the
opposite direction, in favor of the taxable party, when the asset is under
taxed (lower EMTR). With the exception of real estate subject to a real
property tax, leveraged and overtaxed assets are rare. In contrast, leveraged
and under taxed assets are common. Yet § 514 sweeps nearly all debtfinanced income of nonprofits into the UBIT. That is so without regard to
whether there is a tax saving or competitive advantage.
D. Private Activity Bonds
In the previous section, I showed that nonprofits do not generally enjoy
an advantage in competitiveness by virtue of their exemption from taxation
when they finance their investments using market rate debt. Thus, it
value and that the lessee cannot pay. Such a risk, of course, varies depending on the
property and the lessee.
118. See Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance (8th ed. 2006);
Stephen A. Ross et al., Corporate Finance (6th ed. 2002). Similarly, the lessor’s position is
analogous to lending to the lessee to purchase the property.
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follows that neither § 514, which imposes UBIT on debt-financed
investments of nonprofits, or § 511, which taxes nonprofits on their income
from unrelated businesses, can be justified on the ground that market rate
debt financing generally provides nonprofits with an advantage in
competitiveness over taxable competitors.
However, some charitable organizations, including many universities and
hospitals, have access to below-market financing. Section 103(a) excludes
interest earned on state and local bonds from federal gross income. Most
bonds, including bonds issued by corporations and the federal government,
pay taxable interest. The holder of a taxable bond includes interest received
as income119 and pays tax on that interest at her own rate. In contrast, the
holder of a state or municipal bond can exclude from federal income the
interest on such a bond.120 As a result, tax-exempt bonds pay lower interest
rates than equivalent taxable bonds. In effect, taxable investors bid up the
price and down the return on tax-exempt bonds. Such a reduced return is an
implicit tax to the lender, but it is a subsidy to the borrower.121
Charitable organizations cannot issue tax-exempt bonds directly.
However, state and local governments can issue tax-exempt private activity
bonds on their behalf. Private activity bonds are bonds issued by state and
local governments where the proceeds are directed toward a trade or
business carried on by a nongovernmental person.122 One of the entities on
behalf of which state and local governments can issue tax-exempt private
activity bonds are § 501(c)(3) organizations.123 Thus, when private activity
bond financing is available, it can provide tax-exempt charities with a taxinduced competitive advantage over for-profit entities. This section looks
at the significance of such financing for the UBIT.
Return to the example and assume that the nonprofit can use private
activity bonds to finance its purchase of the candidate investment. In order
to calculate the nonprofit’s maximum purchase price, we need to make an
assumption about the interest rate paid on such bonds. For example, if the
taxpayer who sets the price of tax-exempt bonds (the marginal investor in
tax-exempt bonds) is in the 35% tax bracket, such a taxpayer will be
indifferent to holding a taxable bond or an otherwise identical tax-exempt
bond if the tax-exempt bond pays 65% as much interest as the taxable bond.
Thus, given a 10% interest rate on taxable bonds, the tax-exempt bond will
pay 6.5%. Alternatively, if the marginal investor is in the 20% tax bracket,
the tax-exempt bond will pay 8%.124 Thus, if N can finance the candidate
investment by borrowing the full purchase price at 8%, then the maximum

119. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2000).
120. Id. § 103(a).
121. See Scholes et al., supra note 52, at 196–97.
122. See I.R.C. § 141(b)(1).
123. See id. §§ 103, 141.
124. There is evidence that long-term, tax-exempt bonds pay interest at rates that imply
implicit tax rates below the top statutory tax rate.
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is calculated as

PV(Nexempt finance) = $100,000/.08 = $1,250,000

It therefore follows that if N can finance the full cost of the candidate
investment using tax-exempt debt, N will outbid P for the project. Recall
that the present value of the cash flow from the candidate investment to P
was $1 million. Nonprofits will, thus, have a tax-induced competitive
advantage over for-profit entities in competing for commercial assets that
can be financed using tax-exempt debt.
There are, however, various requirements that a § 501(c)(3) organization
must meet in order for any private activity bonds issued on its behalf to
generate tax-exempt interest. If the organization does not meet these
requirements, the interest on the disqualified bonds is taxable. Among the
principal requirements that qualified § 501(c)(3) bonds must meet are the
following: (1) at least 95% of the net proceeds of a qualified 501(c)(3)
bond must be used to finance property owned by a § 501(c)(3) organization
or a governmental unit; (2) at least 95% of the property financed by the
bond issue must be owned either by the § 501(c)(3) organization or by a
state and local government; and (3) the bonds must be repaid both directly
and indirectly from funds received by the nonprofit in its exempt
function.126
The above requirements prohibit nonprofits from using private activity
bonds to fund investments in unrelated businesses and commercial real
estate. They also make it very difficult for nonprofits to indirectly finance
such investments. Of course, money is fungible and whether an unrelated
business is making an issuance of private activity bonds feasible might not
be clear. Thus, there might be an incentive to try to fund such enterprises
indirectly. Even so, there are additional reasons to believe that in many
cases, private activity funding is not available at the margin for commercial
enterprises of nonprofits.
First, there is a maximum amount of private activity bonds that a
borrower can have outstanding. The limit is set at $150 million for
nonhospital bonds.127 For some borrowers, such as major universities, the
nonhospital limit is binding and so they cannot borrow more to finance their
unrelated business activities. For nonprofits that are at the cap, any new
investment must be financed internally or through market rate debt.128

125. Denote the tax-exempt interest rate at which N can borrow by re. The present value
of the candidate investment to N, PV(Nexempt finance), is as follows: PV(Nexempt fnance) = c/re.
That is obviously greater than PV(N) = PV(P) = c/r when re is less than r.
126. See Washlick, supra note 98, at 152.
127. I.R.C. § 145(b).
128. There is no maximum on hospital debt. See id. § 145(b)(1). There is, however, still a
prohibition on using hospital bonds to finance unrelated activities—they count towards the
5% bad use. Because many activities carried out by nonprofit hospitals as part of their
exempt function are also carried out by for-profit hospitals, that raises the question whether
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Second, nonprofits cannot issue tax-exempt bonds themselves. They can
only issue them through state and local governments and only with the
explicit permission of the issuing government. That approval makes it less
likely that the bonds will be issued to finance unrelated businesses, either
directly or indirectly.
Third, there is another set of restrictions on § 501(c)(3) bonds, called the
arbitrage bond rules. Like other tax-exempt bonds, § 501(c)(3) bonds are
subject to the anti-arbitrage rules in § 148. These rules prohibit the issuer
from investing the proceeds raised by issuing tax-exempt bonds, or the
funds replaced by such proceeds, at a materially higher yield than the yield
on the borrowings. An arbitrage bond is defined as a tax-exempt bond
issue, the proceeds of which are reasonably expected at the time of issuance
to be used directly or indirectly to acquire higher yielding investments or to
replace funds that are used to acquire directly or indirectly higher yielding
investments. The issuer of an arbitrage bond is required to rebate to the
Treasury the difference between the amount earned on the bond proceeds
over the amount that would have been earned if the proceeds of the bond
issuance were invested at the yield on the tax-exempt bonds.129 One
consequence of these rules is that they make it more difficult to use taxexempt debt to finance business investments indirectly because the
proceeds cannot be parked in financial assets, without triggering the
arbitrage bond rules.
One argument that has been made in favor of both §§ 511 and 514 is that
tax-exempt debt financing, when it is available, provides nonprofits with a
tax-induced advantage in competitiveness over their for-profit rivals. As a
solution to such a narrow problem, §§ 511 and 514 are extraordinarily
broad. The most intense competition between for-profit firms and
nonprofits financed with tax-exempt debt probably involves hospitals,
where Congress elected to lift the limitation on tax-exempt debt. However,
the UBIT, if it applied to projects financed with tax-exempt debt, would not
generally level the playing field between nonprofit and for-profit firms.
That can be seen with the example. The UBIT would reduce the annual
cash flow to $65,000. At an 8% discount rate, the project has a present
value of $812,500.130 Thus, in the example, the UBIT would place N at a
disadvantage.
A better response than the UBIT comes from the arbitrage penalties. In
that instance, the borrower pays the difference between yield and taxexempt borrowing costs. Such a penalty, if it can be enforced, will tend to
the differences in the services provided by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are significant
enough to justify the subsidy. See also Horwitz, supra note 88.
129. I.R.C. § 148(f)(2).
130. Note that if the tax-exempt borrowing rate was 6.5%, the project with the UBIT
would have a present value of $1 million. That the UBIT gives the right answer in that
circumstance, however, is a coincidence. It occurs because the UBIT tax rate, which is the
corporate tax rate of 35%, is also the personal tax rate that sets the interest rate on the taxexempt bond.

2007]

THE UBIT

891

make the borrowing cost to charitable organizations the taxable rate. That
will tend to eliminate any advantage from using tax-exempt debt financing
to acquire commercial assets. Of course, that would also eliminate any
reason for using tax-exempt financing and take away the benefit Congress
provided nonprofits by allowing them to use tax-exempt financing.
CONCLUSION
The traditional argument for the UBIT is that the UBIT is necessary in
order to level the playing field between nonprofits and for-profit businesses
when both compete in the same market. Without the UBIT, the nonprofits’
exemption from tax would provide them with a competitive advantage over
their for-profit rivals. The argument is as follows: The exemption
increases the cash flow a nonprofit earns from a given investment relative to
that of an equally efficient for-profit owner. Because an investor who earns
more is willing to pay more for an asset, it is reasonable to expect that if
competition from nonprofits were not restrained, then nonprofits would
outbid for-profit entities for many assets.
That situation, the argument goes, is further exacerbated by the
availability of debt financing, which allows investors to control assets that
are worth more in aggregate than their total capital. Viewed from this
perspective, it is easy to see why Congress was concerned that charities
might control a large proportion of the economy’s productive assets.
Moreover, the above line of thought suggests that if charities do not control
a large portion of the economy’s assets it is likely because they are
inefficient managers. Even here, there is a problem. That is because the tax
system encourages inefficient charities to replace more efficient for-profit
owners. The logic behind the UBIT, then, is that it prevents less efficient
nonprofits from taking control of assets from more efficient, but tax
disadvantaged for-profit actors.
Although intuitively appealing, the logic underlying the UBIT is wrong.
Under ordinary circumstances, the exemption from tax does not provide
nonprofits with the ability to outbid their for-profit competitors for business
assets. That is because the nonprofits’ tax exemption, which increases the
nonprofits’ after-tax cash flow from any active business it operates relative
to that of a taxable competitor, also increases the nonprofits’ after-tax cash
flow from any alternative investment relative to that of a taxable
competitor. Thus, the exemption has two offsetting effects: It increases the
cash flow from operating an active business, which tends to advantage
nonprofits, and it increases the cash flow from any alternative investment
the nonprofit would make, which tends to disadvantage nonprofits. These
two effects move in opposite directions and tend to offset one another.
When the asset under consideration is taxed the same as the alternative use
of funds, then the two effects exactly offset one another. Thus, the net
effect is generally to leave nonprofits and for-profit businesses on equal
competitive footing before consideration of the UBIT. The only assets for
which nonprofits have a tax-induced advantage in competitiveness are those
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that are taxed more heavily than typical alternative assets. The two most
significant examples are investments made through corporate equity and
real estate that would be subject to a real property tax if it were held by an
individual or a business.
Once the UBIT is taken into account, the effect is to disadvantage the
nonprofit relative to the competing for-profit business. The UBIT reduces
the nonprofit’s cash flow from unrelated active businesses only.
Specifically, it has no effect on the cash flow from passive investments.
Because investing in passive assets is always an alternative use of funds for
a § 501(c)(3) entity, the UBIT reduces the charities after-tax return from
investing in the unrelated active business relative to investing in a passive
asset. Thus, the UBIT will generally reduce the value of investments in
unrelated active businesses relative to passive investments. It is by virtue of
such an effect that the UBIT tilts what would otherwise be a level playing
field against nonprofits in favor of for-profit competitors.
Also, § 514, which taxes nonprofits on their income from debt-financed
investments, cannot be justified on the grounds of leveling the playing field
between nonprofits and for-profit businesses. Nonprofits do not enjoy an
advantage in competitiveness when they finance their investments using
market rate debt. Accordingly, § 514, which was enacted in response to a
narrow and specific abuse, is too broad.

